No matter what was going to happen, there still would be revenge." Working principles He quotes Zheleznyakov on the purpose of Perimeter being "to cool down all these hotheads and extremists.
In contrast, Thompson argues that Perimeter's function was to limit acts of misjudgment by political or military leadership in the tight decision-making window between SLBM/ cruise missile launches and impact.
The Soviet Union took steps to ensure that nuclear retaliation, and hence deterrence, remained possible even if its leadership were to be destroyed in a surprise attack. Therefore, US or UK Trident submarine systems could stealthily approach an enemy's coast and launch highly accurate warheads at close range, reducing the available warning to less than three minutes, making a counterforce first strike or a decapitation strike viable.
The Trident D5 is considered as accurate as any land-based ICBM. The development of highly accurate SLBMs, such as the Trident C4 and, later, the D5, upset this balance. This made an effective first strike difficult, because the opponent would have time to launch on warning to reduce the risk of their forces being destroyed on the ground. In the first case, an opponent with effective radar and satellite surveillance could expect a 30-minute warning of an attack before the first detonation. SLBMs were reserved for attacking cities, where accuracy was of less importance. sub-launched missiles, such as the 1960s-vintage UGM-27 Polaris and 1970s-vintage UGM-73 Poseidon, were considered too inaccurate for a counterforce or first-strike attack, an attack against an opponent's weapons. Until then, the United States would have delivered most nuclear weapons by long-range bomber or ICBM. development of highly accurate submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) systems in the 1980s. Soviet concern about the issue grew with the U.S. The purpose of the Dead Hand system, as described in the book of the same name, was to maintain a second-strike capability, by ensuring that the destruction of the Soviet leadership would not have prevented the Soviet military from releasing its weapons. Thus, use of the system would theoretically reduce the likeliness of a false-alarm-triggered retaliation. Upon receiving warnings about a nuclear attack, the leader could activate the system, and then wait for further developments, assured by the fact that even the destruction of all key personnel with the authority to command the response to the attack could still not prevent a retaliatory strike. To ensure its functionality the system was designed to be fully automatic, with the ability to decide an adequate retaliatory strike on its own with no (or minimal) human involvement in the event of an all-out attack.Īccording to Vladimir Yarynich, a developer of the system, this system also served as a buffer against hasty decisions based on unverified information by the country's leadership. It was meant to be a backup communication system, in case the key components of the "Kazbek" command system and the link to the Strategic Missile Forces are destroyed by a decapitation first strike. "Perimeter" appeared as an alternative system for all units armed with nuclear weapons. 4.2 Autonomous command and control system.By most accounts, it is normally switched off and is supposed to be activated during times of crisis however, as of 2009, it was said to remain fully functional and able to serve its purpose when needed. An example of fail-deadly and mutual assured destruction deterrence, it can automatically initiate the launch of the Russian intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) by sending a pre-entered highest-authority order from the General Staff of the Armed Forces, Strategic Missile Force Management to command posts and individual silos if a nuclear strike is detected by seismic, light, radioactivity, and pressure sensors even with the commanding elements fully destroyed. The system remains in use in the post-Soviet Russian Federation. "Perimeter" System, with the GRAU Index 15E601, Cyrillic: 15Э601), also known as Perimeter, is a Cold War-era automatic nuclear weapons-control system (similar in concept to the American AN/DRC-8 Emergency Rocket Communications System) that was constructed by the Soviet Union. For other uses, see Dead Hand (disambiguation).
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